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I. INTRODUCTION 
The archetypal mayors of the 1990s act like city managers,
not social levelers. New York’s Rudy Giuliani, Chicago’s
Richard M. Daley, Philadelphia’s Edward Rendell, and
Los Angeles’ Richard Riordan emphasize their skills at
providing safety and attracting business. While many of
these leaders enact policies that are aimed at the poor, their
political appeal is based primarily on their ability to
provide basic public services and to attract businesses. The
change from taking care of the poor to providing basic
urban services is not just rhetoric. New York City’s public
assistance rolls have dropped by almost 400,000 during
Giuliani’s tenure (see Citizens Budget Commission [vari-
ous years]). 
This current phenomenon would not be unusual
if it were not for the mayors that these men replaced.
In the 1960s, 1970s, and even as late as the 1980s, big-city
government often defined itself by its attempts at redis-
tribution. Mayors such as John Lindsay, Coleman Young,
and Marion Barry were supported by electoral coalitions
whose leaders counted on significant redistribution to the
less advantaged, both formally through official programs
and informally through patronage. Local redistribution
started long before the 1960s. James Michael Curley was just
as much of a redistributionary mayor as Coleman Young. 
Big cities are still unusually oriented toward
providing services to the poor, even controlling for the level
of poverty. Cities with more than one million inhabitants
spend 2.5 percent of their budget, or $88 per inhabitant,
on local welfare expenditures. By comparison, cities with
populations between 2,500 and 10,000 spend 0.7 percent of
their budget, or less than $3 per inhabitant, on local welfare
expenditures. Cities with more than one million inhabit-
ants spend 7.4 percent of their budgets on public hous-
ing and public health. Small towns spend 3.6 percent of
their budget on these categories. Thus, despite the massive
decline in big-city redistribution over the past decade, big
cities are still unusual in their tendency to allocate expen-
ditures to the poor.
These expenditure differences result in real differ-
ences over space in the amount of income received from
the government by the poor. Poorer residents of big cities
are more likely to receive public housing and receive
larger amounts of public assistance (despite supposedly
uniform statewide policies). We believe that the greater
abundance of transfers in cities (relative to suburbs and
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small towns) contributes to the segregation of the poor
into large cities, which we believe is a policy issue of first
magnitude. 
We consider two puzzles about the local safety net
and New York City. First, why do big cities, and particularly
New York, engage in so much more redistribution than
small towns? The broad question (the connection between
cities and redistribution) is the topic of the companion
paper to this one (Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport 1999). Our
second puzzle is to understand why the level of redistribu-
tion in New York City (and to a certain extent elsewhere)
has declined so substantially over the past three decades.
We use results from our companion paper to explain the
level and the trend of New York City’s redistribution
policies. We need to understand why New York City pro-
vides local redistribution to seriously evaluate whether this
redistribution will continue to be a feature of New York
City life. 
Changes in local generosity have both positive and
negative aspects. Obviously, we may find it undesirable for
the poor to receive less from local government. Such trends
might exacerbate income inequality. However, differences
in the availability of transfers over space create spatial dis-
tortions that encourage the poor to disproportionately live
in big cities. Our goal here is not to evaluate the effects of
the local safety net, but rather to understand its causes and
particularly the causes of its decline in New York City.
This paper has five primary sections. In the first
section, we present an overview of the ways in which local-
ities actually redistribute to the poor. In the next section,
we discuss the determinants of the costs of redistribution
and the benefits of redistribution. Benefits include cash
transfers for voters who are themselves poor or who care
altruistically about the poor. Costs include tax payments
and (depending on the tax instrument used) reduced labor
demand and housing prices.
Section III presents a brief overview of the his-
tory of redistribution in New York City. New York’s
exceptionalism really started during the New Deal under
LaGuardia. During the 1950s and early 1960s, New York
remained distinct from other large cities, but the differ-
ences were small. It was really under Lindsay that New
York City developed a redistribution system that separated
it from all other cities. The last decade has seen a striking
increase, followed by a decrease, in the amount of redis-
tribution within the city. 
The final two sections attempt to formally explain
why New York City is different from other cities and why
its redistribution levels have changed over time. Using
regression estimates from a nationwide city-level data set,
we present a decomposition analysis of underlying city
attributes to explain the gap between New York and other
cities or between New York in 1970 and New York in
1990. We find that no one variable explains the greater
tendency of New York City to redistribute income relative
to other large cities. It is, in fact, not an outlier once you
control for its tremendous population, but that would be
close to assuming the conclusion. We find that perhaps
one-quarter of the difference can be explained by low rates
of home ownership in New York. Close to 40 percent of the
difference can be explained with variables meant to capture
the relatively immobile New York tax base. The remainder
of the New York redistribution can be attributed to greater
proximity between rich and poor in the city and perhaps
higher levels of attention to the needs of the poor because
of that proximity.
There are four effects that together explain more
than 85 percent of the change in New York’s level of
redistribution relative to other cities over time. Increased
home ownership rates and increased population mobility
explain a large fraction of the reduction in New York’s
relative generosity between 1970 and 1990. Reduced
manufacturing employment rates explain part of the
decline in New York’s redistribution efforts, but they do
not explain the decline relative to other cities. There has
been a general decline in the relationship between land
area and redistribution. In 1970, cities with more land
area tended to redistribute more income. We interpret this
change as relating to the general decline in the market
power of large cities. Increased employer and household
mobility and the existence of edge cities mean that large
cities no longer have the monopoly power that they onceFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1999 119
had. As these cities’ monopoly power declines, so does
their ability to redistribute. 
II. HOW LOCALITIES REDISTRIBUTE
In the long run, economic theory predicts that localities
cannot redistribute (Feldstein and Vaillant 1998). Mobility
ensures that utility levels are constant for all income groups
across space. In practice, cities can and do redistribute. Even
if utility levels are ex ante identical across cities, there are
almost always quasi-rents created by moving costs, and
redistributionary city leaders can exploit these quasi-rents.
In other words, even if a firm will in equilibrium be
indifferent between all possible localities ex ante, ex post
the firm will have sunk down roots and the city can redis-
tribute by taxing the firm. Of course, the firm will have
expected this ex ante and firms will receive up-front
payments or tax abatements from the city to compensate
for higher expected taxes. 
There are many mechanisms that cities use to
redistribute income from their richer residents and firms to
the poor, who are better endowed with votes than they are
with income. The most obvious form of spending on local
redistribution is local welfare spending itself. The only
problem with calling this spending local redistribution
is that AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children)
levels are officially set at the state rather than at the
municipality level.1 In practice, however, as our case study
illustrates, cities have a great deal of discretion about the
size of their local safety net.2 Welfare takeup rates are
always much less than 100 percent everywhere. As the
costs of getting AFDC payments decline (inconvenience,
distance to office, and stigma are all forms of costs), takeup
rates rise. 
City government chooses the size and character of
the bureaucracy, which handles the welfare program and
thereby chooses the cost of receiving welfare payments.
This bureaucracy can either be inaccessible physically and
generally hostile to claimants or accessible and encourag-
ing. More spending on the bureaucratic side of welfare
can lead to higher welfare rolls if the spending is targeted
toward getting eligible citizens on welfare (Shefter 1985).
While welfare spending is not the primary form of redis-
tribution for most cities, it is the clearest form of redis-
tribution enacted at the city level. There are forms of pure
redistribution other than AFDC payments.3 These extra
programs give the city flexibility in expanding or contract-
ing welfare rolls that extend beyond the choices made by
the federal government concerning eligibility. 
The second major form of local redistribution is
building public housing. While there is often a sizable
local component of public housing spending, much of
public housing spending is primarily decided by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
at the national level. As shown elsewhere (Glaeser, Kahn,
and Rappaport 1999), these federal housing payments are
particularly targeted toward larger cities, and these transfers
reflect the single largest reason why transfer to the poor
rises with city size. The discretion of localities over the
nature of public spending is certainly limited, but the
locality naturally has control over many details of both the
construction and operation of public housing.4
The third form of public spending on redistribu-
tion is public hospitals. Public hospitals serve the city’s
poorer residents.5 Spending on public hospitals and the
availability of public hospitals is higher in big cities. Some
fraction of this greater spending may occur because of scale
economies in this sort of health provision. Major cities,
such as New York, train a large share of the nation’s future
doctors. Much of this education occurs at public hospitals.
However, the bulk of the connection between hospital
spending and city size is due to the greater urban proclivity
toward redistribution to the poor, and this form of spend-
ing is a big share of total big-city redistribution. 
Redistribution also works through the tax system.
New York City has personal and corporate income taxes,
which are imposed on both residents and commuters (at
different rates). These taxes together produce 20 percent of
city revenues.6 The income tax in New York is sharply
progressive and has been in place since the Lindsay admin-
istration. Corporate income taxes are also progressive
(because shareholders are unlikely to be poor) and represent
a particular tax on out-of-city shareholders.120 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1999
Other forms of redistribution are frequently more
opaque and include public employment, schooling, polic-
ing, and transportation. Public employment has been a
classic means of redistributing income to the poor in
many cases (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1998). Indeed,
Fernando Wood’s plans for large-scale redistribution in
mid-nineteenth-century New York hinged upon using the
poor as municipal laborers (and selling food at below cost
to the poor). Redistribution through schooling policies also
appears to be important. Lindsay’s open-enrollment policy
in City College is a classic move to change the target
audience of public higher education in New York. Police
can either undertake policies that are aimed primarily at
protecting the safety and property of richer residents or
respecting the rights (and protecting the property) of
poorer residents.7 Public transportation also becomes redis-
tribution if it is underpriced and used disproportionately
by the poor. In New York, public transportation is less
redistributionary than in many other big cities because an
unusually large share of New York’s residents use public
transportation to get to work. 
 Two final forms of redistribution are the use of
debt financing and a variety of regulations. At first glance,
this use of debt appears to be a transfer from future city
residents to current city residents. Indeed, at the national
level, the effect of borrowing influences these sorts of
transfers. However, the classic logic of urban economics
tells us that the future taxes implied by debt obligations
will be capitalized in the value of real estate. As such,
the price of borrowing is paid not by future residents
(who after all need to be attracted to New York), but
rather by current landlords. Thus, borrowing represents a
transfer from owners and landlords to current renters.
Regulations, such as rent control, can also be a major
form of redistribution.
III. THE DETERMINANTS OF THE LEVEL 
OF REDISTRIBUTION
In this section, we give an overview of the determinants of
the level of redistribution. We divide the reasons why voters
support redistribution to the poor into three broad groups.
First, the voters or groups may be poor themselves. There-
fore, supporting redistribution is basic self-interest. Second,
the voters may be altruistic and may gain utility from
reducing other’s poverty. Third, increases in redistribution
may be sought because voters believe that poverty induces
negative-externality-creating behavior such as crime and
riots. Increases in the degree of poverty, the level of altru-
ism, or the fear of crime will all act to increase the desire
for redistributing money to the poor. 
The primary costs of redistribution are tax pay-
ments. The costs of redistribution can be classified into two
broad categories. First, there is the series of costs, both
direct and indirect, that reduce taxpayer real income
even if no household or firm chooses to migrate away
from the high-tax city. Second, there are those taxes that
affect taxpayers only because they will elicit a mobility
response. In other words, in response to these taxes both
capital and labor may flee the city. This response will
reduce property values and possibly reduce wages. This
mobility may also change the ratio of high-skill workers
to low-skill workers, which may also be considered unde-
sirable by the median voter.
The direct costs of redistribution include the taxes
paid by consumers themselves. These taxes include property
taxes (for homeowners), sales taxes, and income taxes. Even
in these cases, the incidence of these taxes will not neces-
sarily fall completely on these consumers. Indirect costs
include taxes that are not directly paid by consumers. For
renters, these taxes include property taxes, which eventually
result in higher rents. 
The extent to which forms of redistribution have
direct costs depends in part on the extent to which federal
and state government directly fund the redistribution.
Thus, in the case of New York’s welfare spending (not
Home Relief), the city only spends $.25 on the dollar for
its redistribution. As such, the cost of redistribution to the
city is much lower than its real social cost because the
remainder is being paid by tax revenues shared across the
entire country. No observer of federal public housing
spending can ignore the fact that powerful local politicians
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in gaining generous public housing spending from the
federal government. This form of redistribution should
be understood not as an exogenous flow of manna from
Washington to the cities, but rather as a decision made
by city politicians themselves to use their political clout
in Washington to go after redistributionary (rather than
other) forms of government spending.8
A second major long-run cost of local redistribution
is to increase the outmigration of households and firms
that flee to locations offering higher services per dollar
of taxes paid. Since cross-city migration costs are low,
taxpayers and firms will leave when localities attempt to
redistribute. This will happen any time the representative
voter attempts to impose taxes that are unattractive to
the marginal resident of the community. Voters have an
incentive to recognize that transfer policies will induce
migration (Epple and Romer 1991). Local labor demand
might fall as employers exit. The tax base would be
affected both by employer migration and by the outmigra-
tion of richer taxpayers. This dynamic creates the classic
negative fiscal externality on the remaining taxpayers.
They will need to tax themselves more to maintain the
same level of redistribution to the poor. Generous locales
will experience outmigration of their tax base and face an
inmigration of the poor, who will require more expenditure
to maintain the same level of transfers (Borjas 1998). As
the rich leave, property values will decline. This lowers
homeowner utility levels but raises renter utility levels. 
Finally, as the rich leave and the poor enter, the
city’s average level of human capital is likely to fall. Recent
empirical studies have found that local human capital
agglomeration increases the attractiveness of the city both
as a residential area and as a center for production (Rauch
1993; Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer 1995). There is
some evidence to suggest that these spillover effects are
becoming more important over time. 
Outmigration by the wealthy in the face of
increased local redistribution will anger homeowners but
may strengthen politicians whose core constituency are the
recipients of local transfers. We call this the Curley Effect.
The political leadership may actually prefer to drive away
the tax base rather than to attract it. This effect occurs
when the leadership is supported by low-income recipients
and disliked by high-income taxpayers. Therefore, such
leadership may actually like the fact that the city repels its
high-income residents, even taking into account that these
residents take away revenues as they leave. If the benefits
for the political survival of the leadership outweigh the
costs of lost revenues, then the leadership will redistribute
more rather than less. This type of effect can lead to very
segregated cities where the poor receive little local redistri-
bution because the rich have all left. We associate this
effect with James Michael Curley not only because he
followed a policy of driving the high-income Boston resi-
dents (who persistently opposed him) out of the city, but
also because he openly proclaimed his desire to see the
upper-class Bostonians leave.9 
NATIONWIDE EVIDENCE ON THE DETERMINANTS 
OF LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION
As part of a larger project, we have constructed a nation-
wide data set of all cities with a population greater than
10,000. The 1970 and 1990 data sets are fully discussed
in Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport (1999). The raw data are
from the Census of Governments and the Census of Popula-
tion and Housing. Our measure of local redistribution is
real per-capita local expenditure on public welfare plus
housing plus public health net of intergovernmental trans-
fers. Controlling for a city’s poverty rate and the city’s
demographic composition, we explore what factors explain
local redistribution.10 Our regression framework is pre-
sented in equation 1.
(1)   .
In estimating equation 1, we have explored how our results
are affected by including state-level fixed-effects. We esti-
mate the equation using ordinary-least-squares and two-
stage least-squares regressions.
Building on the previous section’s discussion, we
focus on six major explanations for differences in city redis-
tribution: (1) poverty and racial effects, (2) home ownership,
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(3) the immobility of firms, (4) the immobility of workers,
(5) fixed city resources, and (6) the proximity between rich
and poor. For use in our subsequent decompositions, we
also measure, when possible, if the coefficient estimates
have changed between 1970 and 1990. We feel confident
in claiming that we have separately identified estimates for
1970 and 1990 using two types of variables: basic poverty
effects and city land area. 
First, it is natural to believe that the level of redis-
tribution will rise with the level of poverty in the city and
with the racial characteristics of the city that often proxy
for poverty levels. Our ordinary-least-squares estimate of
the effect of poverty is 1.85 in 1990. In 1970, the coeffi-
cient is 1.17. These estimates are actually relatively sensitive
to the choice of other variables to include. The effects of
percentage African-American are .91 in 1990 and 1.54 in
1970. The effects of percentage Hispanic are .56 in 1990
and .96 in 1970. These estimates indicate that, all else
equal, if a city’s percentage of Hispanic residents in 1990
increased by 10 percentage points, then local redistribution
would rise by 9.6 percent.
Homeowners have a greater stake in their city’s
fiscal health than renters do. Since it is homeowners
who suffer when property values decline, it is homeown-
ers who should most fiercely oppose redistribution. We
find that the coefficient on home ownership is -1.43. In
fact, our range of home ownership coefficients is fairly
large, but this figure represents a reasonable midpoint
of the different estimates. We do not feel sufficiently
confident in our results to argue that we can convinc-
ingly measure the change in the effect of home owner-
ship over time. 
When there are restrictions on mobility, then the
costs of redistributing become lower.11 Industries that
have substantial fixed infrastructure cannot exit easily. For
these industries, high taxes may act only to repel new
entry. Since most evidence suggests that manufacturing is
much more capital-intensive than services (outside of the
use of expensive real estate), this argument suggests that
the level of manufacturing in a city should increase the
level of redistribution. Our best estimate of the effect of
manufacturing is 2. This figure is the average of a fixed-
effects estimate of 3 and an ordinary-least-squares estimate
of 1. We have also found that the impact of industry
presence in 1930 is positive, and we believe that this finding
emphasizes the importance of fixed resources in predicting
the level of redistribution. 
Factors determining the mobility of taxpayers will
also be important. Demographic characteristics that are
associated with higher levels of mobility should predict
lower levels of redistribution. Cities where a large fraction
of residents work near their homes should have more
redistribution. Cities with an older population, or a popula-
tion featuring lower levels of education, can redistribute
more without suffering sharp outmigration because these
demographic groups have low migration rates. Using
information on a city’s resident age and education distribu-
tion, we construct a predicted mobility rate. In estimates
of equation 1, this variable has a coefficient of -5.59.
Again, we do not believe that we can measure different
elasticities for 1970 and 1990. 
A second measure of taxpayer mobility is whether
the taxpayers both live and work in the city. This variable
is one of the most effective measures that we have in pre-
dicting the level of redistribution. Our best estimate is that
an increase of 10 percent in the number of people who live
and work in the city raises the level of redistribution by
.3 log points. This effect is robust to a range of instrumental
variables estimates. 
Proximity might be expected to effect redistri-
bution because proximity could lead to higher levels of
either altruism or fear. Our measure of proximity is the
number of poor people living within one mile of the
average nonpoor person. Our estimate of the importance
of proximity is .11. 
A final effect that can be used to explain redis-
tribution is the land area of the city. For one, it is more
difficult to leave larger cities. Moreover, cities that have
more land can be thought of as having more fixed
resources to redistribute against. The elasticity of redis-
tribution with respect to land area in 1970 is .34; the
elasticity of redistribution in 1990 is .25. FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1999 123
IV. REDISTRIBUTION TO THE POOR
IN NEW YORK CITY
In this section, we sketch the history of redistribution by
the New York City government. The goal is to use the
theory outlined in the previous section to address the sub-
stantial changes in the level of redistributionary policies in
New York City over the past century. 
BEFORE THE NEW DEAL
Since before the days of Fernando Wood, whose decline
(and the subsequent rise of William Marcy Tweed) was
related to his aggressive attempts at redistribution,
New York mayors have often attempted ambitious
redistribution projects. Indeed, New York City engaged
in healthy spending on charities and public hospitals
at the beginning of the century. In 1912, the city spent
$9.3 million, or $1.86 per capita—equal to $125 million,
or $25 per capita in current dollars—on charities and public
hospitals. All told, New York City spent 7.5 percent of its
total budget on these redistributionary functions. 
While these quantities are large in objective
terms and large relative to spending across all American
municipalities with more than 30,000 inhabitants, these
numbers are not all that great relative to other big cities.
Across cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants, spend-
ing on welfare was $1.34 per capita, or 6.4 percent of total
spending. Big cities were redistributing more than small
cities (in part because they have a greater number of poor
people), but New York City was not unusual among
progressive-era cities.
Moderate levels of redistribution to the poor in
New York City occurred through the Walker adminis-
tration. As late as 1928, the city was spending 5.9 per-
cent of its budget on charities and hospitals. By
comparison, the average city of more than 500,000
inhabitants was also spending 6.1 percent of its budget
on these items. New York’s economy was doing well
and part of the implicit bargain that existed between
Tammany Hall and New York’s business elite appears
to have been moderate spending on redistributional
functions. 
LAGUARDIA TO WAGNER
Moderation in local charity disappeared completely with
the advent of LaGuardia and the New Deal. By 1937, the
city was spending 24.4 percent of its budget (or $214
per capita, in 1998 dollars) on charity. The other cities
with more than 500,000 inhabitants were spending only
14.3 percent of their budgets on these items. More than
66 percent of this spending in New York was classified
as general relief. Smaller quantities were targeted toward
children or other specific charities.
Surprisingly, these forms of relief were not pri-
marily transfers from either the federal or state governments.
Furthermore, these government transfers were targeted
to specific New Deal programs rather than to general
relief. The 24.4 percent of the budget that LaGuardia was
spending based on local revenues far exceeded the New Deal
expenditure in New York and represented the lion’s share of
relief for the poor in New York City during the Depression.
Naturally, this begs the question of why LaGuardia
responded to the Depression with so much redistribu-
tion or, phrased differently, why voters supported such a
redistribution-oriented mayor in New York but not else-
where. No other big American city came close to being so
aggressive in creating poor relief. One explanation is that
demand for redistribution rose equally across large cities,
but in New York the costs of redistribution were much
lower because businesses were less likely to exit. New York
was still a manufacturing city with a tremendous industrial
base. Transportation was sufficiently expensive to make
nearby suburbs tenuous competitors. 
The state legislature had already freed up
LaGuardia’s taxing authority in response to the fiscal crisis
of 1933. New York had the lowest home ownership rate of
any major city, so increases in property taxes would not
affect LaGuardia’s voters directly. There are also unique
institutional features of New York politics, such as the
ascendancy of a reform candidate who needed to create a
local and formal support base to combat the still extremely
solid support enjoyed by Tammany Hall.
As the economy improved and as priorities
changed with the war, New York’s level of formal redistri-124 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1999
Chart 2 
Trends in Intergovernmental Revenue Transfers 
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bution declined. By the early 1950s, spending on welfare
was 12 percent of New York City’s budget (Chart 1). Of
course, this level of redistribution is low relative to the
Depression-era heights of redistribution, but it is still high
relative to other cities of comparable size. Indeed, this
budget share is comparable to that of other cities during
the Depression, and much higher than that of other cities
during the post-war boom. 
While the post-war era saw a general retrenchment
of redistribution in the city, that era also witnessed one of
the largest single pieces of redistribution in city history—
the enactment of rent control. A war-era control on rents,
which was eliminated in many other large cities, was main-
tained (until today) in New York City as renters used their
political clout to redistribute from owners to themselves.
Given New York’s extremely low rates of home ownership,
it is not surprising that there was particularly strong
electoral support for that type of redistribution in the city. 
As Chart 1 shows, the level of formal spending on
redistribution rose only slightly under the three Wagner
administrations. Between the early 1950s and 1965, the city
spent between 10.0 and 12.5 percent of its budget on wel-
fare each year. Business-cycle downturns and the
destruction of Tammany Hall in the 1961 election
appear to have made little difference in the overall level
of this type of redistributional spending. 
THE CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH: THE LINDSAY, 
BEAME, AND KOCH YEARS
The real explosion in the level of redistribution (as a share
of spending) occurred in the three years after the election of
John Lindsay in 1965 (Chart 1). The share of welfare
spending rose from 12.5 percent in 1965 to 23.0 percent
three years later.12 
Naturally, a significant fraction of this growth was
related to changes at the federal government level, as shown
in Chart 2. Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society was in full
swing, and the federal government had begun introducing
significant incentives to expand the welfare rolls (by paying
for a large fraction of overall welfare expenditures). How-
ever, New York’s increase was far greater than the increase
for urban America as a whole. For example, among other
large cities, the share of spending on welfare rose from
5.4 percent in 1964 to 8.5 percent four years later. The
base level was already below New York’s level of redistribu-
tion, and the gap increased during the Lindsay years.
The Lindsay years were also marked by a substan-
tial increase in the overall scale of government. Public
employment rose by about 25 percent during the early
Lindsay years. Increases in employment were particularly
high among minority and lower income groups, which
suggests that the increases in employment were anotherFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1999 125
Chart 3
The Impact of Local Business Cycles on New York City’s 
Public Assistance Rolls
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major way in which Lindsay redistributed income through
government. Indeed, it is hard to find an area of govern-
ment that Lindsay did not try to use to better the lives of
the city’s poorer residents. 
New York still had extremely low levels of home
ownership, so few residents were worried that changes in
the attractiveness of the city would decrease their property
values. Furthermore, because rents were so constrained,
landlords also had little to lose from decreasing the future
attractiveness of New York by borrowing. As discussed
above, under normal circumstances, owners will suffer
when cities attempt to borrow to finance current expendi-
tures. In New York, where rents are controlled, only future
renters pay the costs for these future taxes, and future rent-
ers do not vote. 
During the early Lindsay years, manufacturing
was still strong and the tax base appeared to be immobile
enough to withstand heavy redistribution. Suburbanization
of residents had occurred, but starting in the 1960s,
New York gained from the state the ability to impose an
income tax on commuters so that workers could no longer
escape the city’s taxing authority by moving beyond city
lines. New York’s uniquely difficult geography made sub-
urban exodus of firms particularly difficult. As a result, it
appeared that New York could tax and spend with rela-
tively little impunity from a tax-base exodus. Of course,
that did not happen. Between 1969 and 1985, New York
City lost more than 400,000 manufacturing jobs. 
Furthermore, federal support for the city abated
during Republican administrations. If New York leaders
had believed that higher levels of government would bail
them out during the Rockefeller-Johnson years, certainly
any residual of those beliefs were shattered by Ford’s pithy
response to city requests for aid. 
As government continued to grow and as city
leaders turned to borrowing rather than attempting to get
state approval for higher taxes, the fiscal crisis developed.
Ultimately, the city was unable to sell its bonds and the
state set up the Municipal Assistance Corporation to over-
see the running of the city. Essentially, the corporation led
to a real cutback of local democracy. Business leaders on the
corporation were given emergency fiscal powers over the
city. These leaders cared more about the city’s financial
health than electoral support from its poorer residents.
This focus led to a major retrenchment in the level of redis-
tribution of the city. 
Public employment rebounded slightly during the
later Koch years, but spending on welfare and welfare rolls
declined in the late 1980s (Charts 1, 3, and 4). However,
Koch had been elected as the alternative to redistributionary
democracy, and essentially he stuck to his initial campaign
appeal. While Giuliani is responsible for a much more severe
and quicker reduction in welfare rolls, Koch presided over
a slow but steady reduction in spending on welfare during
his twelve years in office. Although the share on spending
declined (in part because of rising city budgets), the
number of people on public assistance essentially stayed
constant (at close to 800,000) during his administration.
DINKINS AND GIULIANI
The steady reduction in spending on welfare changed radi-
cally during the Dinkins years. Although Dinkins never
espoused the rhetoric of redistribution used by Lindsay or
LaGuardia, his four years in power saw a 50 percent
increase in the number of people on the welfare rolls. The
share of the budget going to welfare rose by 6 percent dur-
ing the same period. While this increase is not on the level126 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1999
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of the changes implemented either by LaGuardia or by
Lindsay, it is quite sizable, representing a radical break
with the Koch era.
There is little literature on this phenomenon. The
contemporaneous accounts stress the business-cycle down-
turn of the early 1990s. There are actually surprisingly few
of these accounts—a Lexis Nexis search on “Dinkins”
and “welfare” turned up 126 articles during his tenure.
A similar search on “Giuliani” and “welfare” turned up
close to 1,000 articles. Chart 3 shows the actual level of
redistribution plotted with the level of redistribution pre-
dicted by the New York business cycle.13 
While there is no doubt that actual economic con-
ditions in the city drive some part of the variation in the
level of welfare, the intentions of city leadership appear to
be far more important. The decision made by the Dinkins
administration to be more inclusive in expanding the
welfare rolls was the crucial factor in the explosion of redis-
tribution in his administration. Like Lindsay, Dinkins
attempted to simultaneously please the business leaders
of the city and his poorer constituents. However, by the
late 1980s, New York no longer had any real monopoly
power over its firms. The city faced a much rougher set of
competitors, both locally (such as Stamford, Connecticut)
and across America. Local redistribution is likely to have
contributed to declining New York City property values
during the Dinkins administration.
Voters responded by electing the most clearly
anti-redistributionary mayor in New York’s post–Fernando
Wood history. During the Giuliani years, government
spending has been relatively constant, but there have been
radical reductions in redistribution. Increased spending
on policing, fire, and schooling have offset reductions in
redistribution. As Chart 1 shows, the share of spending on
welfare declined almost 7 percent during the Giuliani admin-
istration. This change marks a radical change in the general
level of redistribution of New York City government. 
There are several possible explanations for the
popularity of reduced redistribution. First, as discussed
earlier, the degree of mobility of firms has increased and as
such voters no longer can believe that attempts at redis-
tribution will not affect the economic health of the city.
Second, there has been a small but significant increase in
the level of home ownership. Third, it is possible that in this
knowledge-based economy there is increased importance
placed on being around more highly skilled neighbors.
V. DO THE LEVEL AND THE TREND IN 
NEW YORK HAVE A SAFETY NET?
In Section III, we sketched national findings on the relative
propensities of different cities to redistribute income. Here,
we focus on New York City. Using the national estimates
of the correlates of redistribution and using the characteris-
tics of New York City in 1972 and 1987, we discuss the
model’s prediction of New York City’s level and time trend
in redistribution expenditures. The difference in logarithms
between New York City and other big cities is 1.16, which
is the per-capita redistribution difference that needs to be
explained.
(2)    
 
         .
 Table 1 examines the potential explanations for
redistribution; there are several variables that significantly
differ between New York City and the rest of the country.
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opinion poll (which we use as a proxy for altruism). New
Yorkers have a substantially lower home ownership rate.
New York is underrepresented in manufacturing (but this
should predict less redistribution, not more). It has more
land area, making it more of a local monopoly. It has greater
proximity between rich and poor. This variable is mea-
sured as the number of poor people living within one mile
of the average rich person. Finally, a greater percentage of
New York’s residential population lives and works within
its own border than is the case in the other cities.
Interestingly, New York is not unusual in its
poverty rate or in its racial demographics. Large cities form
a reasonable comparison group with New York along these
dimensions, at least for 1990. New York has a higher
percentage of Hispanics, but we have never found a con-
nection between the percentage of Hispanic residents and
the level of redistribution. 
Table 2 considers these differences formally and
shows that we can account for 64 percent of the difference
between New York and other cities with our primary
explanatory variables. In the table, we list our elasticity
estimates and the differences in the levels of the explana-
tory variables. 
There are four variables that explain the majority
of the difference between New York and other cities. The
most important explanatory variable for New York City is
the level of home ownership. About 23 percent of this
difference is related to lower home ownership rates in the
city. About 14 percent of the gap can be explained by
greater proximity between rich and poor in New York City.
About 15 percent of the effects can be explained by two
variables relating to the mobility of workers. About two-
thirds of that percentage are the mobility variables based
on resident demographics. About one-third is related to the
Table 1
THE LEVEL OF REDISTRIBUTION PER CAPITA IN NEW YORK CITY AND OTHER CITIES IN 1990
New York City Other Large Cities Small Cities
Measures of redistribution
Redistribution expenditure - intergovernmental support 285.03 89.51 15.67
Total redistribution expenditure 1,228.16 246.81 68.59
Intergovernmental expenditure 767.61 133.89 20.38
Welfare - intergovernmental support -39.07 16.99 2.24
Health - intergovernmental support 378.51 67.91 34.51
Housing - intergovernmental support 121.10 28.02 11.46
Percentage of total expenditure on redistribution 0.28 0.09 0.06
Total redistribution per person in poverty 6,367.97 1,522.20 530.28
Redistribution expenditure per person in poverty 1,477.85 541.42 158.35
Share of employees working for local government 0.12 0.08 0.07
Explanations of redistribution
Percentage of respondents who believe that the government should spend more on welfare .53 .45a .45a
Percentage of housing stock that is single-detached 0.08 0.39 0.55
Percentage of workers in manufacturing 0.11 0.15 0.18
Home ownership rate 0.29 0.48 0.57
Average population 7,322,564 1,058,008 73,378
Average land area 800 539 80
Percentage of population that is black 0.29 0.28 0.12
Percentage of population that is Hispanic 0.24 0.17 0.10
Poverty rate 0.19 0.19 0.14
Percentage of workers who live and work in the city 92.20 75.50 46.10
Proximity between rich and poor 13,240 3,450 1,573
Percentage of workers who are commuters 21.29 42.10 60.60
Source:  Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport (1999).
Notes: “Other large cities” are defined as those with more than 500,000 persons. “Small cities” are cities with a population of between 25,000 and 500,000 people.
Except for rates or percentages, variables are per-capita dollar amounts.
aResults are for the entire nation outside of New York according to the General Social Survey, produced by the National Opinion Research Center.128 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1999
variable that captures living and working in the city. And
10 percent of this difference relates to New York City hav-
ing more land. Thus, these variables have explained almost
70 percent of the difference. We believe that the remaining
difference is best explained by other variables that capture
the size of the job base in New York City and the relative
immobility of resources in New York in relationship to
other cities. 
VI. WHY HAS THE LOCAL SAFETY NET
IN NEW YORK CITY DECLINED?
To begin to understand why New York City’s redistri-
bution level has declined more than that of other cities,
we present some basic summary statistics on trends over
time (Table 3). Between 1970 and 1990, New York
City’s per-capita net redistribution level (measured in
1987 dollars) declined from $537 to $285, while the
average big city’s net redistribution level increased from
$65 to $90. Between 1970 and 1990, New York City’s
home ownership rate and its percentage of blacks and
Hispanics increased faster than in other big cities.
We approach the change over time similarly to the
way we approached the difference between New York City
and other large cities. We allow for one important change:
the determinants of redistribution might change over time.
Using estimates of equation 1 based on our 1970 and
1990 samples, we are able to measure how the correlation
between city attributes and local redistribution changes over
time. The first thing that we do is look at a differences-in-
differences formulation, where we correct for the mean
level of redistribution in all cities and look at the effects of
explanatory variables, which are also demeaned. 
With this adjustment, the decomposition becomes:
(3)   
   ,
where all of the explanatory variables have been
demeaned.14 The basic results are presented in Table 4.
The change in excess redistribution is .57 (the total reduc-












A DECOMPOSITION OF THE FACTORS DETERMINING NEW YORK CITY’S REDISTRIBUTION RELATIVE TO OTHER LARGE CITIES IN 1990
Explanation for Local Redistribution Level
Regression Coefficients 
Estimated Based on 
Equation 1
New York City’s 
Explanatory Regressor
Average Explanatory 
Regressor for Other 
Big Cities
Explanation’s Contribution to 
New York City’s Higher
Redistribution (Equation 2)
Land area 0.156 6.68 6.03 0.10
Percentage in poverty -0.121 0.19 0.19 -0.00
Percentage black 1.33 0.29 0.28 0.01
Percentage Hispanic 0.82 0.24 0.17 0.06
Home ownership rate -1.42 0.29 0.48 0.27
Percentage in manufacturing 2.00 0.11 0.15 -0.06
Population mobility index -6.67 0.51 0.52 0.10
Percentage of workers who live and work in the city 0.30 4.52 4.31 0.06
Proximity between rich and poor 0.11 9.49 8.02 0.15
Total explained 0.70
The log differential in New York City versus other big
   cities’ average redistribution level 1.16
Unexplained 0.46
Source:  Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport (1999).
Notes: Using the 1990 sample from the Census of Governments and the Census of Population and Housing, we use all cities with more than 10,000 people to estimate a 
multivariate regression based on equation 1. The dependent variable is the log of a city’s per-capita redistribution net of intergovernmental transfers. The regression 
includes all of the variables listed above and state-level fixed-effects. The left column reports the coefficient estimates. The two middle columns report New York City’s 
values for each of these variables and the mean value of the explanatory variables for all other cities whose population is greater than 500,000. “Land area,” “percentage of 
workers who live and work in the city,” and “proximity between rich and poor” are all logged. The other variables are percentages. The right column is based on 
equation 2 in the text. To calculate, we subtract the two middle columns and multiply by the regression coefficient to yield an estimate of how much of the total difference 
in redistribution between New York City and other big cities can be explained by this variable.FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1999 129
cities is .06). Thus, the change in the level of redistribution
is considerably smaller than the difference in the level of
redistribution between New York and the other cities.
Following equation 3, the change in the level of
redistribution can be decomposed into changes coming
from changes within New York (given fixed coefficient
estimates) and changes in the coefficient estimates multi-
plied by initial New York variable values. In general, we
will focus only on a single important change in parameter
estimates: the sharp decline in the importance of the loga-
rithm of land area. 
In Table 4, we have allowed the coefficients to
change only for four variables (poverty, area, percentage
black, and percentage Hispanic). Our view is that we might
be able to estimate changing coefficients for these very basic
variables. Our coefficients for the other variables are based on
a wide range of different estimation techniques, and we can-
not sensibly distinguish the changing importance of these
variables over time. Furthermore, several of our variables
(such as living and working in the same city and proximity
to the poor) are not available for 1970, and we therefore
must drop them from the decomposition. 
There are four major explanations for the
decline in the level of redistribution between 1970 and
1990. First, the level of home ownership rose in New
York, and this rise can explain about 22 percent of the
decline in redistribution. Second, New York’s demo-
graphics have shifted toward more mobile residents, and
this explains perhaps 12 percent of the decline in redis-
tribution. Third, New York had a substantial decline in
manufacturing. This does not show up in our numbers
because we have examined New York relative to other
cities. If we examined New York relative to the entire
United States, however, the decline in the level of manu-
facturing would be a major factor. The overall decline in
manufacturing in New York is equal to .092. With our
elasticity of 2, this means that the manufacturing
decline explains approximately one-third of the total
decline in New York’s level of redistribution. However,
it explains very little of New York’s decline relative to
that of other cities. 
Finally, there has been a general decline in the
effect of land area on the amount of redistribution. We
examine this variable as opposed to population density or
Table 3
THE PATH OF REDISTRIBUTION AND OTHER VARIABLES  IN NEW YORK CITY AND OTHER LARGE CITIES
New York City Other Large Cities
1970 1990 1970 1990
Measures of redistribution
Redistribution expenditure - intergovernmental support 537.38 285.03 65.13 89.51
Total redistribution expenditure 1,491.67 1,228.16 216.59 246.81
Intergovernmental expenditure 857.33 767.61 125.21 133.89
Welfare - intergovernmental support 96.31 -39.07 25.67 16.99
Health - intergovernmental support 418.81 378.51 63.76 67.91
Housing - intergovernmental support 119.22 121.10 1.95 28.02
Percentage of total expenditure on redistribution 0.37 0.28 0.12 0.09
Total redistribution per person in poverty 9,992.45 6,367.97 1,374.53 1,522.20
City redistribution expenditure per person in poverty 3,599.81 1,477.85 392.00 541.42
Share of employees working for local government 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.08
Explanations of redistribution
Percentage of workers in manufacturing 0.21 0.11 0.21 0.15
Home ownership rate 0.24 0.29 0.49 0.48
Percentage of population that is black 0.21 0.29 0.25 0.28
Percentage of population that is Hispanic 0.10 0.24 0.08 0.17
Poverty rate 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.19
Source:  Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport (1999).
Note:  Except for rates or percentages, all variables are per-capita dollar amounts.130 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1999
raw population simply because area is more exogenous and
represents a further step backward from what we are trying
to explain. Changes in the coefficient of land area lead to
a total decline of .30, which is more than 50 percent of
the total decline. We believe that the declining connec-
tion between land area and the level of redistribution is
a result of the increased ability of firms and workers to
locate and operate in edge cities and suburbs. Improved
transportation has meant that even the largest cities no
longer have monopoly power over their local residents
and firms.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the 1970s, cities with more land area (such as New
York) engaged in more redistribution. Today, they do not.
Local redistribution can exist only when cities possess a
fixed tax base. As transport costs have declined in the glo-
bal economy, cities have lost the power to redistribute.
Ultimately, this may be good for the poor because it may
lessen their segregation in central cities. However, in the
short run, as local distribution dries up, the higher levels of
government may want to step in to eliminate the hardship
that may be caused by the decline of the local safety net. 
Table 4
A DECOMPOSITION OF THE FACTORS DETERMINING CHANGES IN NEW YORK CITY’S REDISTRIBUTION 
RELATIVE TO OTHER LARGE CITIES: 1970-90
Regression Coefficient
New York City’s
Explanatory Regressor Decomposition Based on





Land area 0.34 0.25 3.28 3.29 0.004 -0.30
Percentage in poverty 1.17 1.85 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.02
Percentage black 1.54 0.91 0.14 0.19 0.05 -0.09
Percentage Hispanic 0.96 0.56 0.06 0.16 0.05 -0.02
Percentage homeowner -1.44 -1.44 -0.41 -0.325 -0.12 0
Percentage in manufacturing 2.00 2.00 -0.061 -0.067 -0.012 0
Population mobility index -5.59 -5.59 -0.02 -0.0039 -0.087 0
Total explained -0.06 -0.38
Actual relative change -0.57
Unexplained -0.13
Source:  Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport (1999).
Notes:  The actual relative change is defined as the percentage change in New York City redistribution between 1970 and 1990 minus the percentage change in other 
cities’ redistribution between 1970 and 1990. The total explained is the sum of the two decomposition terms listed in equation 3. The two left columns report estimates 
of equation 1 using the 1970 and 1990 samples of the Census of Governments as discussed in Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport (1999). The 1990 cross-sectional estimates 
presented in the table differ from the results presented in Table 2 because the specifications differ. In particular, we do not have data for the variables “live and work” and 
“proximity between the rich and poor” in 1970. The explanatory regressors are calculated by subtracting out the sample means.ENDNOTES
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1. Taking into account the federal matching program, the state sets a
benefit level and then (usually) directly pays for those benefits. In the case
of New York City, the sharing pattern has generally been 50-25-25, with
the federal government paying for one-half of AFDC payments and the
remainder being split between the state and city government (Shefter
1985). In principle, these programs are at the discretion of the states
rather than of the cities. 
2. The massive swing upward in welfare rolls during the Dinkins years
(which was much higher than the economic downturn itself would have
predicted) followed by the massive swing downward in welfare rolls
during the Giuliani years (which has been much larger than the upturn
would predict) are at the very least evidence of the power of mayoral
discretion in determining the size of these welfare rolls. 
3. After all, New York City was spending almost one-quarter of its
budget on general relief during the Great Depression. Today, New York
maintains Home Relief, which provides aid for poor people who are not
technically qualified to receive welfare payments. In addition, older
people who have recently moved to the United States may be eligible for
Supplemental Security Income.
4. This discretion over operation is occasionally curtailed when the
quality of operation has become particularly low, in which case the
federal government may set up an independent housing authority. In all
cases, however, the city has a great deal of flexibility in determining the
rules surrounding construction itself; these rules may be designed to
facilitate redistribution or to limit it. 
5. In fact, Duggan (1998) shows that these hospitals are particularly
ineffective at reaping the cash benefits from increases in Medicaid relative
to their nonprofit and for-profit competitors. 
6. The commuter tax of .45 percent of taxable income was recently
repealed by the New York State Legislature. 
7. Police records by precinct in New York show that the ratio of arrests
per crime and the ratio of police per capita across area is hardly constant.
The differences in crime rates are not the result of an uneven allocation of
resources so much as a lack of response to the high-crime area. 
8. Urban politicians have a choice about whether to use their influence
to try and secure public housing funds, which primarily serve the city’s
poorer residents, or highway infrastructure funds, which primarily serve
the city’s richer residents. The decision to focus on public housing rather
than transportation represents a choice made at the local level for
redistribution. Naturally, this choice in lobbying is accompanied by local
spending on redistribution as well. For example, consider two forms of
government transfers to large cities: public housing and highway
infrastructure (for example, Boston’s Big Dig).
9. One famous Curleyism is his response to a request by a British
recruiting agent in World War I to allow the agent to recruit Bostonians
of English extraction to fight in Europe (before American entry) by
saying “go ahead, take every damn one of them” (Beatty 1992, p. 5).
Throughout Curley’s term, his policies frequently seemed designed with
either no attention to migration effects or to an enjoyment of the fact that
these policies would induce residents to migrate out.  
10. For an analysis of how demographics affect the composition of the
public bundle, see Poterba (1997).
11. To try and capture the presence of fixed resources, which can be
taxed without inducing outmigration, we investigate the role of
relatively exogenous factors such as state capitals and natural ports. In
both cases, it is true that these resources are positively related to the level
of redistribution. 
12. The data source for these figures is the Citizens Budget
Commission,  CBC Pocket Summary.
13. Our method was to regress the level of redistribution on detrended
income in the city and to plot the predicted values from that regression
over the 1978-98 period. In fact, there is little powerful connection
between the number of welfare cases (or spending on welfare) in New
York and the business cycle over this period.
14. Technically, we start by writing:
           
            .
We then subtract excess redistribution in 1970, or 
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